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China's Arctic policy: present and future 
Abstract: The article examines China’s Arctic policy features and the meaning of the first published White 
Paper of 2018 for the future behaviors of the PRC. The author reviews the interests of the PRC in the 
High North, and the political objectives and means. The article pays special attention to the origins of 
Chinese policy in the Arctic, including the national strategy, expert discourse, and regional specifics. The 
author discusses the role of the Chinese public and private actors for the implementation of national 
achievements in the circumpolar region. The article examines Chinese interpretations of key international 
documents regulating activities in the Arctic, and the significance of these interpretations for the 
implementation of the PRC policy. The special emphasis is made of the diplomacy features and the role 
of the “soft” and “hard” power when China is interacting with different actors. The author explores the 
interconnection of the White Paper “China’s Arctic Policy” with the implementation of the “Arctic Silk 
Road”. As an outcome, the author indicates principles explaining China's Arctic behaviors in the long-
term perspective. 
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Introduction  
Prior to the publication of the White Paper, China’s Arctic behaviors gave rise to discussions about the long-
term plans and principles of the PRC diplomacy in relations with other actors. A variety of scientific works 
outside of China were devoted to the country's policy in the Arctic - from the comprehensive analysis 
(Stensdal, I, Tonami, A. Jakobson, L., Lee, S.-H., Rainwater, S., Konyshev V., Sergunin A., Kobzeva M., 
Komissina I.) to studying individual aspects such as security, influence on the Scandinavian countries, 
strategic interests, etc. (Dwyer W. G. III, Kossa, M., Sørensen, C.T.N, Klimenko, E., Krovorotov A.K., 
Tulupov D.).1 At the same time, noting the ambivalence of PRC diplomacy which includes simultaneous 
                                                 
1 Stensdal, “Asian Arctic Research 2005-2012: Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger”; Jakobson, and Lee, “The North East 
Asian states’ interests in the Arctic and possible cooperation with the Kingdom of Denmark”; Dwyer III, “China’s 
Strategic Interests in the Arctic”; Rainwater, “Race to the north: China’s Arctic strategy and Its implications”; Kossa, 
 
 
peaceful declarations and assertiveness towards participation in regional development, experts have been 
considering it through the lens of China's foreign policy ambitions. Nevertheless, the influence of regional 
specifics, the development of 'discursive power' and other internal political factors remained beyond the focus 
or were interpreted more like symptoms. Concurrently, the growing number of Chinese authors was 
attempting to cover all possible topics and give a comprehensive assessment of the Arctic policy. At the same 
time, the outcomes of these articles often came down to looking for a model for China’s participation in Arctic 
affairs.2 
The publication of the official document, it would seem, could have clarified the situation; however, 
experts have estimated the document differently. For instance, Sørensen, N. C. T., and Lajeunesse, Adam, 
believe that the White Paper is an indicator of China’s strategic interest in the region and a step towards a 
more confident policy.3 Hong Nong and Xinmin M.A. suppose that the document is China’s attempt to clarify 
its intentions and demonstrate the willingness to build strategic cooperation; thus, they pay special attention 
to how the document reflects the previously announced ideas. In general, many experts have come to the 
                                                 
“The rise of China in the Arctic? Domestic motives, actors and international context”; Tonami, “Asian Foreign 
Policy in a Changing Arctic. The Diplomacy of Economy and Science at New Frontiers”; Sørensen, and Klimenko. 
“Emerging Chinese-Russian cooperation in the Arctic: Possibilities and constraints”; Tulupov, “Skandinavskiy 
vektor arkticheskoy politiki Kitaya”; Krivorotov, “Arkticheskaya aktivizatsiya Kitaya: vzglyad iz Skandinavii”; 
Komissina, “Arkticheskiy vektor vneshney politiki Kitaya”; Konyshev, and Sergunin, “Osvoyeniye prirodnykh 
resursov Arktiki: puti sotrudnichestva Rossii s Kitayem v interesakh budushchego”; Konyshev, and Kobzeva, 
“Politika Kitaya v Arktike: traditsii i sovremennost'”. 
2 Li, “Zhongguo canyu beiji hangxian guoji jizhi de zhang'ai ji duice”; Liu, “‘Yidai yilu’ zhanlue beijing xia de beiji 
hangxian kaifa liyong”; Lu, “Nuowei dui si wa'er ba de qundao guanxia quan di xingzhi bianxi — yi yun si pi ci bei 
er gen qundao tiaoyue zui wei shijiao”; Pan, and Zheng. “Beiji diqu de zhanlue jiazhi yu zhongguo guojia liyi yanjiu”; 
Sun, and Guo, “Beiji zhili jizhi bianqian ji zhongguo de canyu zhanlue yanjiu”; Wang, “Jiyu SWOT fenxi fa yanjiu 
woguo beiji youqi hezuo zhanlue”; Yang, Liu, and Xin. “Woguo zengqiang zai beiji diqu shi zhi xing cunzai de 
shixian lujing yanjiu”. 
3 Sørensen, “China as an Arctic Great Power. Potential Implications for Greenland and the Danish Realm”; Lajeunesse, 
“Finding 'Win-Win' – China's Arctic Policy and What it Means for Canada”. 
 
 
conclusion that the document rather repeats previous statements.4 Chinese authors, in turn, actively joined in 
the discussion of the document and began to propose new approaches to the management of the Arctic based 
on the White Paper’s thesis. 5  However, is the document really nothing new? – This question remains 
controversial. In this regard, the study aims to examine the indicated problem, taking into account the previous 
studies of the author towards China’s Arctic policies’ formation, and to clarify, what role does China seek to 
play in the Arctic affairs? To what extent are the principles mentioned in the White Paper consistent with 
China’s real policy, and which of the theses show the long-term trend of China’s policy? 
The research materials relate to the activities of the PRC in the Arctic from the moment of its activation 
in the late 1990s, when regular Arctic research began, until the publication of the White Paper and include 
international documents, Chinese documents and official statements towards the Arctic, as well as expert 
publications in Chinese, English, and Russian. 
In the course of the study, the author maintains the neorealist views on international politics, and 
specifically, the thesis of J. Mearsheimer on the natural desire of China, as a major power, to expand its sphere 
of influence. 6  Such an approach allows critically exploring the activities of the PRC in the Arctic and 
assessing the conflict potential of the international environment where the national interests of the participants 
limit cooperation. 
The author used an institutional method for studying the elements of China’s decision-making system 
for the Arctic, including key institutions of the PRC's, and the range of Arctic actors, including countries and 
international organizations, interacting with China. 
                                                 
4 Hong, “China's Interests in the Arctic: Opportunities and Challenges”, 1; Xinmin, “China's Arctic policy on the basis 
of international law: Identification, goals, principles and positions”; Lim, “China’s Arctic Policy & the Polar Silk 
Road Vision”. 
5 Feng, “Zhongguo de beiji zhengce yu beiji shengtai huanjing gongtongti de goujian——yi beiji huanjing guoji fazhi 
wei shijiao”; Wang, and Cui. “Yidai yilu” kuangjia xia de beiji guoji hezuo: Luoji yu moshi”; Li, “Ruhe zhunque 
lijie zhongguo de beiji zhengce”; Feng, “Zhongguo beiji zhengdang quanyi ying shou zunzhong”. 
6 Mearsheimer, Can China Rise Peacefully?  
 
 
The first part of the article provides a general description of China’s policy in the Arctic, such as its 
origins, key actors, the specifics of interpreting the legislative documents, which are fundamental to China, 
and the peculiarities of China’s diplomacy regarding various Arctic actors. The second part of the article is 
devoted to a new document, an analysis of its content, the reasons for publication and link with the 'Arctic 
Silk Road' initiative. In conclusion, the author offers her own reading of the White Paper and determines the 
basic principles of future China’s Arctic policies. 
Basis of China’s Arctic policy  
Origins of the Arctic policy 
The specifics of the formation of China's Arctic policy is that it is not only the CPC policy, as it may seem if 
we would consider solely the documents and speeches of officials. Our previous research has shown that three 
internal factors shape China’s Arctic policy.7 
Firstly, it is the national strategy, inspired by the ideas of the ‘Chinese dream’ and the ‘Belt and Road’. 
According to the 18th Party Congress’ decisions, China should take advantage of the ‘period of strategic 
opportunities’, achieve economic prosperity and globally play the role of ‘major responsible country’.8 This 
message applies to all significant policy directions, including the Arctic, and is reflected in the theses of the 
White Paper. 
In this regard, it is indicative of how the Arctic activities have gradually joined the state agenda of the 
PRC. The first document, which mentioned the Polar Regions was the National Security Law of the People's 
Republic of China (2015), which considered China’s possible participation in rescue and military operations 
outside the country. Secondly, the 78th point of the list of 100 events planned for a period of the 13th five-year 
                                                 
7 Kobzeva, “Arkticheskiy vektor v politike Kitaya pri novom rukovodstve”, 962–965.  
8 Embassy of the PRC. Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 18th Party Congress. 
 
 
plan mentioned the construction of a new icebreaker and cooperation on the basis of new observation stations 
in the Arctic.9 
In 2017, the Arctic appeared in the “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road 
Initiative». China called on states to cooperate in the construction of the BRI in the Arctic, extracting 
resources, shipping, participating in the activities of international organizations, and so on.10  
Finally, the White Paper confirmed the close relationship between the Arctic policy and national 
strategy of the PRC. The document positioned China, as a ‘responsible power’, which intends to take an active 
part in the study and development of the Arctic, as well as in the governance in the region. In addition, China 
proposed the ‘Arctic Silk Road’ (hereinafter referred to as ASR), thus including the region into the BRI, the 
key project of modern China and the way to the ‘Chinese dream’ to come true.11  
Secondly, Chinese experts actively involved in the conceptual development of the Arctic policy. The 
government set to scholars the task to form the so-called ‘discursive power’ of the country (话语权), in other 
words, to promote concepts at the international level.12 Over the years preceding the White Paper, Chinese 
scientists’ elaborations remained an important source of information on how China perceives the country's 
role in the Arctic. Moreover, as our previous studies have shown, variations on how the Arctic may look like 
due to the China's participation and what role the PRC can (or even have to) play in the region, represent a 
rather patchy picture. From the most moderate assessments, which to the point repeat the statements of 
officials, 13  up to the bright theses of Li Zhengfu about the Big Arctic, which may include not only non-Arctic 
                                                 
9 Xinhua News Agency. Shouquan fabu: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia anquan fa; National People's Congress 
(NPC) of the People's Republic of China. “Shisanwu” tixian zhongguo guojia zhanlue de bai da gongcheng xiangmu 
10 Xinhua News Agency. Full text: Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. 
11 Wu, “Xijinping quanqiu jingji zhili de xin sixiang yu xin shijian”, 11, 15; Konyshev, and Kobzeva, “Politika Kitaya 
v Arktike: traditsii i sovremennost'”, 81, 88. 
12 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Zhang, Zhizhou. “Guoji huayu quan jianshe 
zhong ji da jichu xing lilun wenti”. 
While the English version of the ‘China’s Arctic Policy’ White Paper offers the term ‘Polar Silk road’, the more accurate 
term would be ‘Arctic Silk Road’. 
13 Kobzeva, “Protivorechiya v otsenkakh arkticheskoy politiki KNR”, 214-217. 
 
 
actors that have already declared themselves, but also such countries as Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Either the idea of experts from the Central China 
Normal University towards the perspective of China’s ‘creative intervention’ [创造性介入] into the Arctic 
policy, namely intensifying China’s efforts in the low politics sphere, promoting the interests of non-Arctic 
countries.14 
It is also worth noting the military dimension of Chinese discourse. Assessing the military-strategic 
potential of the Arctic for the PRC, a number of experts consider it possible to play the card in the region. In 
connection with a decrease in the US participation in the policies of the Nordic countries and a growth of 
Russia's military potential, experts discuss an option for China to act as a kind of a new guarantor of security. 
Or, if the United States will try to force the PRC out of the region, to develop a partnership with Russia in 
order to ensure sustainable Arctic activities.15 
Although many statements by Chinese experts should not be automatically attributed to the position 
of China’s leadership, as it has happened in the case with the quote of Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, it is necessary 
to take into account the fact that officials actively use a significant part of formerly debatable theses.16 For 
example, the thesis ‘China is a near-Arctic state’ has circulated among scholars in the past five years and now 
it is tightly bound with Chinese Arctic behaviors. In addition, the concept ‘the Arctic is the common heritage 
of mankind’, which for a long time was discussed among Chinese experts, is now fixed in the softer formula 
a ‘shared future for mankind in the Arctic region’.17 It seems that the scientific community acts as in the well-
known Chinese proverb ‘to cross the river by feeling the stones’. Like the pioneers, experts generate concepts, 
study the international community response and offer the most effective theses. Thus, experts’ discourse 
gradually animates the political rhetoric.  
                                                 
14 Li, Da beiji shijiao xia de fan dongbei ya”, 27; He, and Song, “Chuangzaoxing jieru: Zhongguo canyu beiji diqu shiwu 
de tiaojian yu lujing tansuo”, 53, 55-56. 
15 China-Nordic Arctic Research Center Newsletter. 3nd Issue; Huang. “Zhongguo beiji quanyi de weihu lujing yu celue 
xuanze”, 82.  
16 Kobzeva, “Protivorechiya v otsenkakh arkticheskoy politiki KNR”, 214-217. 
17 The State Council of the People's Republic of China. Full Text: China’s Arctic Policy. 
 
 
The third component is the regional specifics. The outcomes of our previous study on the range of 
regions' involvement in the implementation of China's Arctic policy shows that each entity (province or large 
city) sees its own role in the implementation of national interests. Such variability is associated with historical 
heritage, various opportunities, and priorities. The clear example is the Heilongjiang Province’ relations in the 
Arctic. Since the local government expects to participate in the Arctic development, to this end, the province 
is developing cooperation with the Russian Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. In turn, Shanghai is actively 
developing shipping and is exploring prospects for cooperation with various northern countries’ seaports.18 
Among other things, we have found that positions and topics for discussion in the scientific community 
also have regional dependence. For example, it was found that metropolitan scholars primarily consider the 
energy cooperation of the PRC, while the Shanghai experts insist on the urgent need to improve the Arctic 
legislation, develop shipping and scientific research, and experts from coastal provinces actively examine the 
prospects of expanding the rights of non-Arctic countries.19 
As a result, all three components, the national strategy, expert discourse, and the regional component, 
are involved in decision making and gradually shape China’s Arctic policy. 
From interest to stratagem 
The interests of China, like of any Arctic actor, include many components - from participation in the 
development of resources to the improvement of legal mechanisms. Within the framework of the article, it 
seems appropriate to emphasize how each component correlates with the national interests of the PRC and 
how China strives for it. 
Primarily, it is worth noting the interests, associated with a favorable position and natural resources of 
the region. Firstly, the Arctic is within the radar of the military-strategic interests of the PRC - both due to the 
fact that the polar region partially includes the Bering Strait, where the interests of China, the United States, 
Japan and Russia overlap, and due to the fact that China intends to develop Arctic shipping and is naturally 
                                                 
18 Xu, “Interesy i politika Kitaya v Arktike: istoriya, pravovyye osnovy i realizatsiya”, 58. 
19 Kobzeva, “Protivorechiya v otsenkakh arkticheskoy politiki KNR”, 214-217. 
 
 
interested in ensuring maritime security. For that reason, China seeks to develop its own technologies and 
train personnel capable to work in the High North.20 
As known, China’s activities in the Arctic in this direction are developing not without excesses, if we 
recall the episode with Chinese ships navigating close to the coast of Alaska. 21  Nevertheless, China’s 
participation in the conflict in the Circumpolar North seems unlikely, both because of the lack of adequate 
technologies, and because the international strife will threaten Chinese Arctic projects along the BRI. In this 
connection, PRC experts unanimously condemn the trend towards militarization of the Arctic.22  
Just as much China is interested in the development of Arctic logistics. In recent years, the topic of the 
development of China’s Arctic shipping, as well as the possibility of including the northern routes in the ‘Belt 
and Road’ initiative has become one of the most discussing topics among Chinese experts.23 According to 
preliminary estimates, shipping in the region promises to increase China’s trade with European countries from 
10.95 to 20% and to contribute to ensuring energy security due to diversifying fuel supply routes.24 Such an 
alluring prospect is pushing China to participate seriously in the development of Arctic logistics, railways, 
and ports construction, and to build its own icebreaking fleet.25 Besides, China is actively investing in the 
infrastructure of the Arctic actors. For instance, the PRC invests in the construction of the port in Sabetta 
                                                 
20 Li, Zhan and Ma, “Zhongguo kaifa haishang dongbei hangdao de zhanlue tuijin gouxiang”, 50; Feng, “Beiji hangdao 
tonghang dui dongbei ya de zhanlue yiyi”, 91-92; Li, Zhan and Ma, “Zhongguo kaifa haishang dongbei hangdao de 
zhanlue tuijin gouxiang”, 50. 
21 Washington Post. Chinese naval ships came within 12 nautical miles of American soi. 
22 Ni, and Li. “Zhongguo beiji zhengce de xianzhuang yu qianjing”; Zhang, and Huang. “Zhongguo beiji quanyi de 
weihu lujing yu celue xuanze”, 75-76; Li, Zhan, and Ma, “Zhongguo kaifa haishang dongbei hangdao de zhanlue 
tuijin gouxiang”, 50. 
23 Ibid., 27, 28; Li, and Hu, “Beiji hangdao” kaitong yu zhongguo ji qi shou yingxiang quyu de maoyi zengzhang qianli 
fenxi”, 429, 437. 
24 Yang, “Diyuan keji xue yu guojia anquan: Zhongguo beiji ke kao de zhanlue shenyi”, 131; Li, Zhan, and Ma, 
“Zhongguo kaifa haishang dongbei hangdao de zhanlue tuijin gouxiang”, 48-49. 
25 Pan and Lu. ““Beiji diqu de zhanlue jiazhi yu zhongguo guojia liyi yanjiu”, 119, 123; Konyshev and Sergunin, 
“Strategii stran Vostochnoy Azii v Arktike”, 38; Xinhua News Agency. China's ice breaker sets sail for Arctic rim 
expedition; Cai, COSCO. Arctic Circle 2015. 
 
 
(linked to the ‘Yamal LNG’), in Murmansk port, and Arkhangelsk port (associated with the construction of 
the ‘Belkomur’ railway with Chinese participation), leases the ports of North Korea, etc.26 Thus, today, when 
the ASR came out of backstage discussions to the official level, the basis for its implementation is about ready. 
The integral part of the ASR is mining. By optimistic estimates, the Arctic will provide up to 60% of 
the country's ever-growing need for fuel.27 It is fitting that China’s participation in this field is particularly 
noticeable. Today, in all Arctic countries, there are companies with varying degrees of Chinese involvement. 
The PRC buys shares in extracting companies, purchase exploration rights, concludes long-term supply 
contracts, and develops design-and-engineering for the Arctic.28 Thus, as W. Ostreng wrote in 2013, the 
‘Arctic Silk Road’ will likely unite Arctic mining projects with Chinese participation.29  
The last one area related to the region’s natural resources is aquatic bioresources, in which China, as 
one of the largest consumers, is also in constant need. China actively cooperates with the northern countries 
on the issue of legal regulation and organization of the future fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean.30 Having 
entered into negotiations, China has identified its substantial interest and now has a good reason to prepare 
for the Arctic fishing.31  
It is worth noting, however, that China’s success in the areas listed above has an additional economic 
effect. On the one hand, the implementation of many projects, as well as the pursuit to lead an activity mostly 
independent from other countries, contribute to the development of new technologies - from solving 
                                                 
26  Sina Corp. Zhongguo huo chao gangkou 30 nian shiyong quan han mei cheng xi liyong chaoxian; Staalesen, 
Murmansk counts on Chinese investors. 
27  Deng, “Shipping Matters: The Role of Arctic Shipping in Shaping China’s Engagement in Arctic Resource 
Development,” 63-67; Zha, Arctic Geopolitics: a view from China Arctic Frontiers 2015; Baranikova, and Chen. 
“Zhongguo beiji zhengce de xianzhuang yu qianjing”, 25-27. 
28 To name some of them: Nexen in Canada, Yamal LNG in Russia, Elkem in Norway, Kvanefjeld project in Denmark, 
AAVI Technologies Ltd. in Finland, Elkem Iceland, etc. 
Zha, Arctic Geopolitics: a view from China Arctic Frontiers 2015. 
29 Østreng, et all, Shipping in Arctic Waters. A comparison of the Northeast, Northwest and Trans Polar Passages, 72-
75. 
30 Pan, “Self-Organization: The Governance of CAO Fisheries in the Global Commons”, 20-22. 
31 Liu, Why is China so quiet in negotiations about fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean?  
 
 
engineering problems of shipbuilding and resource extraction to the development of green, environmentally 
friendly technologies. The latter is a particular area for cooperation between the PRC and the Scandinavian 
countries, Canada and the USA.32 On the other hand, China's Arctic activities open up the possibility for the 
development of the Northeast of the country, in particular, the cities of Dalian, Tianjin, Qingdao, Hunchun, 
etc., which are potentially able to integrate into the ASR infrastructure.33 In addition, cooperation in the Arctic 
may help the solution of a number of issues in the Asia-Pacific region via the beneficial cooperation with 
Japan and South Korea. The reason for such an effect is these countries' shared interest towards the peace in 
the North Pacific and the development of the Arctic shipping. Finally, the growing influx of Chinese visitors 
to the region significantly contributes to the development of the travel industry of the PRC.34 
The realization of the mentioned interests hinges on the country’s status as a legitimate actor and its 
body of knowledge on the Arctic. In this regard, the development of Polar Science and the participation in the 
Arctic governance remain the vital tasks. For that reason, both topics constantly appear in Chinese officials' 
statements and documents, including the White Paper. The latter highlights these directions as priority ones.35  
It is worth noting that the protection of legal rights of non-Arctic countries, including the advocacy 
towards the freedom of navigation, also repeatedly identified in the document as an important task, closely 
relates to the development of the discursive power of the PRC. Success in this field coupled with effective 
                                                 
32 Hallding, China’s Arctic Ambitions – actors, drivers and strategies?; Feng, “Beiji hangdao tonghang dui dongbei ya 
de zhanlue yiyi”, 91, 92; Pan, and Lu, “Beiji diqu de zhanlue jiazhi yu zhongguo guojia liyi yanjiu”, 119, 123. 
33 Zhang, and Huang, “Zhongguo beiji quanyi de weihu lujing yu celue xuanze”, 75-76; People's Daily. Zhong e gong 
jian zha lu bi nuo gang; Dou, “Dongbei ya sichou zhi lu yu zhongguo “yidai yilu” zhanlue de tazhan”, 70-71. 
34 Yang, “Diyuan keji xue yu guojia anquan: Zhongguo beiji ke kao de zhanlue shenyi”, 120; Hallding, China’s Arctic 
Ambitions – actors, drivers and strategies?; Feng, “Beiji hangdao tonghang dui dongbei ya de zhanlue yiyi”, 91, 92; 
People's Daily. Shou lun zhong ri han sanguo beiji shiwu gao jibie duihua zai shou'er juxing. 
35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. Zhang Ming. Vice-Foreign Minister, PRC. Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign 
Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly; The State Council of the 
People's Republic of China. Full Text: China’s Arctic Policy. 
 
 
and maximally independent activity are able to prepare the country to a ‘favorable moment’ when, according 
to Chinese scholars, circumstances will allow to fully engaging in the Arctic development.36 
In this perspective, China from the modest participant of the Arctic affairs may turn to be an actor who 
will gradually refine the rules in its favor. In this case, the policy of the PRC in the circumpolar region will 
become a modern illustration of the ancient Chinese stratagem ‘to make the host and the guest exchange roles’, 
of course, with the amendment that this will only apply to certain aspects of legal regulation, and not to 
sovereignty. 
Policy actors 
China’s Arctic breakthrough is the result of joint efforts of state agencies, Chinese business, and ‘soft power’ 
actors. On the top is a divergent structure of organizations, the most significant of which are the Interagency 
Coordinating Mechanism on Arctic Affairs (the division at the Department of Treaty and Law of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs) and the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). The first one is responsible for China’s 
international relations and seems nonpublic. The second one controls, organizes and finances economic and 
scientific activities. 37  Both organizations through a series of higher authorities, report to Xi Jinping.  
The prominent role the Chinese Advisory Committee for Polar Research plays, which brings together 
representatives from fourteen ministries and departments, including the Ministry of Land and Natural 
Resources, manages SOA. Each ministry participates in the implementation of national interests in the Arctic 
and reports to either the State Council, which makes decisions on the financial support, or the People's 
Liberation Army General Staff Department. The committee work is nonpublic, however, this organization is 
obviously an important element in the decision-making process towards Arctic activities.38  
                                                 
36 Wang and Wang, “Zhongguo ruhe yingdui beiji diqu xingshi xin bianhua”, 34-36; Li, “Zhongguo canyu beiji hangxian 
guoji jizhi de zhang'ai ji duice”, 101. 
37 China-Nordic Arctic Research Center Newsletter. 
38 Tonami, Asian Foreign Policy in a Changing Arctic. The Diplomacy of Economy and Science at New Frontiers, 30; 
Ministry of Land Reform. Zhongguo jidi kaocha gongzuo zixun weiyuanhui di 17 ci huiyi zai shanghai zhaokai. 
 
 
The second place among actors of China’s Arctic activities are corporations, which are entrusted with 
the duty of implementing the national plan. The annual reports of PRC companies note the achievements of 
Chinese science and innovative engineering solutions for the Arctic, thus cultivating national pride. The list 
of companies, and best performers of the Arctic development, includes the largest Chinese companies, such 
as CNPC, CNOOC, Sinopec, China National Bluestar, China Investment Corporation, Sinosteel, etc. For 
instance, the key impact on national Arctic navigation development is the progress of the COSCO. The leader 
of Chinese polar shipping, which annually tests Arctic sea routes, develops shipping, and conducts scientific 
research in the field of mineral exploration.39  
Another source of particular pride is the construction of the first made-in-China research icebreaker, 
“Snow Dragon-2” (the ice class PC3), at the leading Chinese shipyard Jiangnan Shipbuilding (Group) Co., 
Ltd. Besides, China opened the bid to construct the first nuclear-powered icebreaker, which should become a 
powerful multipurpose vessel for the Arctic.40 
The third group unites ‘soft power’ actors, who shape the image of China in the Arctic, both for the 
international community and for Chinese citizens. These are scientific institutions, tourist agencies, museums, 
media, cultural initiatives, and individuals: travelers, bloggers, and photographers. Thanks to their efforts, and 
to political support, people take more interest in the region and better understand the reasons for the national 
policy in such a remote land. As a result, the popularity of polar research in the PRC and the number of 
Chinese tourists in the circumpolar countries raises from year by year.41 
                                                 
39 Such as CNPC Offshore Engineering Company, Qingdao McDermott Wuchuan, Honghua Group, Penglai Jutai 
Offshore Engeneering Heavy Industries Co Ltd., Evergreen Holding Group, Bomesc Offshore Engeneering Co Ltd., 
etc. 
40 CNPC. Ya ma'er, chuli beiji quan de LNG chaoji gongcheng; Jiangnan Shipyard (Group) Co., Ltd. Woguo shou zhi 
jidi ke kao pobingchuan jiang yu niandi kaigong, jiangnan zaochuan yu jidi zhongxin qianding jianzao hetong; 
Nilsen, “Details of China’s nuclear-powered icebreaker revealed.” 




Both before and after the White Paper publication, the crucial documents for China’s Arctic policy remain 
with the UN Charter, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Svalbard Treaty and the Polar 
Code.42 Recognition of them is important for two reasons. First, it is helpful to stay a good partner of the 
northern countries, a full participant of the Arctic Council and a legitimate actor of the Arctic governance. 
Secondly, a number of articles in these documents allow fortunate interpretation, which shows the essence of 
the claims of the PRC. 
Firstly, some Chinese experts appeal to article 52 of the UN Charter, which says that regional 
arrangements or agencies and their activities should be consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations. Otherwise, such agencies are in conflict with the Charter. That gives hope for a legitimate 
change in Arctic Council rules of procedure, since these scholars accuse the AC of monopolizing the Arctic.43 
The other interpretation relates to the rules of navigation established by coastal states. The majority of 
Chinese experts appeal to article 234 of the UNCLOS, which requires “consideration of the best available 
scientific evidence”. Through such a lens, the impossibility of free passage seems discriminatory. The article 
77 which says that “coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights”, not the sovereignty, 
may also simplify the regime of navigation. The last mentioned is especially important for China in the case 
of extending the borders of the northern states’ continental shelf.44 Such interpretation, in Chinese experts’ 
opinion, should also prevail over the Svalbard Treaty. Based on the text of the Treaty, experts assert China’s 
equal rights as a signatory, and oppose Norway’s attempts to clip participants’ powers.45 
Alternatively, Chinese experts enthusiastically consider documents, such as the Polar Code, which 
involve China in their refinement. The negotiations on the management of fishing in the Central Arctic ocean 
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are also promising. Chinese experts hope that active participation in the legislation improvement helps China 
to properly represent and assert the interests of non-Arctic countries.46  
It is worth noting that all the above contradictions outline the sphere in which the PRC is ready to 
stand its ground actively – especially in case of any precedent. In support of such an attitude, the White Paper 
outlined the idea of respect to the rights of non-Arctic states as one of the cornerstones of China’s policies.47 
Variable diplomacy 
All of the above shapes China’s Arctic diplomacy, namely, its selective approach to cooperation with different 
actors. According to our previous studies’ outcomes, we have chosen five criteria to describe the diplomacy 
of the PRC: the key thesis, identified in course of the analysis of the Chinese official and expert discourse, the 
image, which China seeks to maintain when interacting with various Arctic actors, the areas of cooperation, 
the use of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power.48  
Among the Arctic actors, there are different points of view on the principles of Arctic governance, and 
their vision does not always coincide with the position of the PRC. This situation affects the Chinese 
diplomacy. For example, the Arctic Five is interested in observing the existing legal framework. Thus, when 
interacting with coastal circumpolar states, China presents itself as a near-Arctic state, insists on the equal 
partnership, and avoids discussing the future of the Arctic as a 'common heritage of humanity', especially, in 
relations with Russia and Canada.49   
However, the topic of the ‘common heritage’ becomes relevant when collaborating with Scandinavian 
countries (except for Norway), EU-non-Arctic countries и South Asia countries, such as Malaysia, Thailand, 
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Singapore, etc. These countries are exploring the possibilities of liberalizing the shipping regime and 
increasing participation in the economic development of the northern territories. In this regard, their position 
is closer to China's in relation to the need of the Arctic governance improvement. Thus, when interacting with 
these states, China discusses the thesis of ‘shared future for mankind in the Arctic’, and with respect to Asian 
actors, is ready to position itself as a ‘responsible power’. A striking example is the AFoPS initiative. As one 
of the leaders of it, China seeks to foster scientific cooperation between Asian countries, and to motivate them 
to develop their own strategies for Arctic research.50 
In relations with Japan and South Korea, which also intend to participate actively in the development 
of the Arctic, there is a peculiarity as well. Taking into account the mutual discords, in Circumpolar North, a 
kind of competitiveness between them occurs. In order to overcome the emerging contradictions, a high-level 
trilateral dialogue has been organized since 2016.51 However, so far this initiative it did not yield any tangible 
results. 
Similarly, the main areas of cooperation of the PRC vary. In the case of the northern countries, China 
primarily develops a comprehensive economic partnership and scientific cooperation. In the case of non-
Arctic EU countries, the promising areas are the Arctic governance, sustainable development of the 
circumpolar territories, scientific research and the rights of indigenous peoples. With the Asian countries, the 
spectrum of interaction is narrower and comes to scientific collaboration and discussions on the Arctic 
governance. This point related to both with the economic competition and in general, with the poorly 
developed Arctic policy of these states.52 
Overall, since the Arctic is of strategic importance for China, the policy of the PRC relies on the 
recognition of the principles proposed by the Arctic Council, and involves the diverse use of ‘soft power’. The 
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last mentioned includes scientific cooperation, tourism, the development of regional and humanitarian ties, 
the consolidation of discursive power and the formation of a positive image of China as a ‘welcome guest’. 
This approach allows China to maintain an atmosphere of mutual confidence and cooperation. As for the use 
of ‘hard power’ by the PRC, today it is extremely limited and may be traced to China’s attempts of economic 
influence when interacting with Nordic countries.53 
Par to the course China’s diplomacy towards various organizations also varies. It is worth noting that 
China is a member of most international organizations related to the Arctic. The major one, Arctic Council, 
does not give the PRC special advantages in promoting the interests of non-Arctic states. In this regard, the 
promising alternative is the country's participation in UN organizations with equality of participants, and in 
particular in the International Seabed Authority. Another platform is the Arctic Circle forum, which in a 
certain sense opens the door for China’s ‘discursive power’ that is limited in the framework of the Arctic 
Council.54 
Due to the different powers of the PRC in the abovementioned organizations, the discussions on the 
‘shared future for mankind in the Arctic’ are relevant in the UN structures (International Seabed Authority, 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, IMO) and other international organizations and forums 
related to the Arctic.55 While that is not China’s thesis for the Arctic Council.  
In most of the organizations, China seeks to promote the image of an important Arctic stakeholder, 
which is legitimate since makes a significant contribution to the development of the region. However, in Asian 
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organizations on the Arctic, as well as organizations where China's political capital is objectively low56, China 
uses the image of a ‘responsible power’, since it correlates with the PRC policy regarding global sustainable 
development.57 
The White Paper and steps forward  
‘China’s Arctic policy’ – what is it about? 
Almost twenty years after the first Arctic expedition of the “Snow Dragon” and the subsequent intensive 
political, economic, and research efforts in the Circumpolar North, China published the White Paper on the 
Arctic. This first document finally outlined China’s view of the Arctic issues, as well as a policy regarding 
international cooperation and resources development: shipping routes, energy resources, water bioresources 
and opportunities for tourism. However, in our opinion, the document has not become a reiteration of previous 
statements. By contrast, it has avowedly shown the nature of China’s policy in the Arctic. 
It is worth paying attention to the causal relationships between the document’s statements. China 
claims that Arctic issues are of a global impact and announce itself a ‘responsible power’. Thereby, the PRC 
emphasizes its moral right and the obligation to take part in the development of the region and to contribute 
to the construction of a ‘shared future for mankind in the Arctic’. 58 
Hence, it also follows that China has legitimate rights in the region. The document elaborates clearly 
that China understands the limitations of its rights, as well as adheres to existing rules. However, the PRC will 
persistently assert the rights it enjoys in accordance with international law (namely, for instance, the 
development of the international seabed area and the advantages of the Svalbard Treaty). It is crucially noting 
that the document does not infringe on the Arctic countries’ rights, but it simply shifts the emphasis to the 
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equality of all participants, including non-Arctic actors and indigenous peoples. At that, the equality of these 
actors is a matter of principle to China as a ‘responsible power’. 59 
Naturally, the two directions of China’s policy appears. The first one is participation in the Arctic 
governance, which China understands as the right to “participate in regulating and managing the affairs and 
activities relating to the Arctic on the basis of rules and mechanisms” and jointly build a shared future for 
humankind. In this regard, the White Paper notes the importance of the Arctic Council for solving problems 
of ecology and sustainable development. However, the insufficiency of it for the region stays between the 
lines. In order to address the problems outside the AС competence China intent to take part in other 
international organizations: foremost, Arctic Science Ministerial Meeting, the Arctic Circle, Arctic Frontiers, 
‘The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue’, CNARC. 60 
On the other hand, to fill the gap in economic development, China proposes the ‘Arctic Silk Road’, 
which requires the coordination of development strategies of all Arctic actors with a particular emphasis on 
shipping. To foster the initiative, China intends to promote its companies and research centers to participate 
in the ASR for the economic benefits of participants and regional development.61 
The conclusion of the document unites the key elements of the policy. These ideas are: the ‘shared 
future for mankind in the Arctic’, ‘China is a responsible major country’, inclusive Arctic governance, and 
the ASR influence for good of the Arctic nations. Thus, the White Paper arranges a logical chain of arguments 
from these once debatable ideas and establishes the solid Arctic policy of the PRC.  






Why did they publish? 
China’s Arctic behaviors have been developing quite smoothly so far, and for a long time, the leadership of 
the PRC, in unison with Chinese experts, was delaying to release the policy.62 Thus, what was the reason to 
publish the White Paper? 
The first, internal cause is that, against the background of the regional variability of the Arctic policy, 
the leadership was in need to setting a single vector. Strengthening the Xi Jinping’s power after the 19th 
Congress was a strong reason for such a step.63 
Secondly, China’s substantial presence in the Arctic caused the need to declare its interests to partners 
in order to avoid the alarmism. The PRC has ceased to be a newcomer to the Arctic. Now, China has the 
material and technical capabilities, scientific and economic experience, a developed administrative structure, 
etc. In the absence of sounded intentions, the further participation of the PRC in mining projects of the Yamal 
LNG scale, an unprecedented breakthrough in the field of Arctic shipping and a significant influx of Chinese 
tourists could be a cause for concern. 64  For this reason, the announcement of goals was a natural and 
reasonable step. 
The third valuable reason is that China was found to be ready to offer its own vision for Arctic 
development, namely, the ‘Arctic Silk Road’ initiative. The ASR, which earlier appeared in documents, 
official statements, and experts’ discussions, the first time, described that clearly in the White Paper – as a 
possible way of international cooperation for the development of the Arctic in the interests of humankind. 65 
This step is due to the fact, that by the time of publication, the ASR had appeared ex-post. Chinese 
companies have been actively involved in the development of Arctic navigation and significant infrastructure 
projects, and the northern regions have been striving to offer their own initiatives to get more investments 
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(such as the ‘Heilongjiang Silk Road’, the ‘Dalian’s Northeast Silk Road’, the development of the Tumen 
River area, etc.) Therefore, as well as for regulating Arctic activities, China’s leadership had a stake to 
consolidate all the activities into one grand state initiative. In addition, due to preliminary discussions and the 
lack of specific obligations on the participating in the ASR, some Arctic states have already expressed an 
interest to it. For example, Russia and Finland offered relevant initiatives, and the Nordic countries joined the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.66 
Yet, assessing the prospect of the ASR as a path for international Arctic development, it is worth noting 
some challenges. Similar to the BRI, the ASR remains not a plan but literally an invitation to cooperation and 
dialogue. On the one hand, it gives flexibility for its implementation, on the other hand, it prevents participants 
from understanding the rules of the game. In this regard, the anxiety among the Arctic countries towards 
financial and technical difficulties of the ASR still prevail over the wish to get benefits of economic 
cooperation. Besides, Chinese identity of the project, enclosed in its name is also confusing. Most of the 
northern countries have no historical connection with the ancient Silk Road, and thus the ASR unlikely seem 
to the Arctic states a truly international initiative. For these reasons, it is worth saying that, despite China’s 
achievements, the future of the ASR remains up in the air. However, the Arctic Silk Road is not the only 
chance for China's Arctic policy to succeed. 
Conclusions  
Firstly, the White Paper set the new level of China's policies in Circumpolar North. The articulated clear 
principles, priorities, and objectives became a guideline for the further development of the Arctic policy and 
the coordination of efforts of all policy actors. However, most importantly, the document confirmed the 
country's intention to build the ASR and identified the Arctic management as one of the key areas of the Arctic 
policy on an equal basis with the development of the region. From that moment, the construction of the ASR 
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will accumulate economic efforts and become a tool for the implementation of China’s national interests in 
the Arctic. The Arctic governance, in its turn, will unite the development of intangible components: the 
institutional and law-making participation, which includes further development of the ‘discursive power’ of 
China.  
Secondly, the White Paper united two controversial components of China’s policy: the adherence to 
the principles stated by the Arctic Council and to the existing legislation, and, at the same time, the intention 
to uphold the legitimate rights of non-Arctic actors and improve legislation in favor of greater openness. Thus, 
the pragmatic approach which allowed the PRC to develop different diplomacy in regard to Arctic actors 
involves now clear arguments for the interpretation of laws and a key tool – participation in the Arctic 
governance. In this regard, despite the commitment to the existing legal regime, in a situation conducive to 
legal changes, the PRC will be an activist towards the rights of non-Arctic countries. If China succeeds in this 
sphere, that will significantly influence the awareness of China’s new role both in the Arctic and globally. 
Thirdly, the analysis of the provisions of the White Paper allows for the defining of principles that 
constitute the essence of the future policy of the PRC in the Arctic. The first component is the Arctic image, 
according to which China is simultaneously a ‘near-Arctic state’, a ‘responsible power’, an ‘important and 
legitimate stakeholder’. The second one is an assertion of China’s rights to develop Arctic resources and 
navigation, to participate in the Arctic governance, and, as a result, the obligation of the PRC to protect the 
legal rights of other non-Arctic countries. The third one is the intention to contribute to the ‘shared future for 
mankind in the Arctic’, through the implementation of the ASR as well. 67  Such a combination will be at the 
heart of Chinese politics in the Arctic – both in the present and in the future. 
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